Post-Quantum Cryptography in IPsec: IKEv2, Standards and Migration
Contents
This is part 2 of a two-part series. Part 1, Post-Quantum Cryptography: Threat, Standards and Timelines, explains why PQC is urgent, who sets the rules, the hybrid concepts and the algorithms. This part applies that to IKEv2 and IPsec.
1. IKEv2 in a nutshell
1.1 The exchanges
IPsec protects IP packets with ESP (Encapsulating Security Payload). The keys come from IKEv2, specified in RFC 7296 (October 2014). RFC 7296 is one of the few IETF Internet Standards (STD 79).
Each exchange is a request and a response. Hover over or tab to a message to see its payloads. Blue arrows (→) are requests, orange arrows (←) are responses. Dashed = optional IKE_INTERMEDIATE (RFC 9242), where large PQ key exchanges go.
- IKE_SA_INIT IKE_SA_INIT request
HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni [, N(...)] - IKE_SA_INIT response
HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr [, CERTREQ] - IKE_INTERMEDIATE IKE_INTERMEDIATE request (optional)
HDR, SK{KEi(n)} - IKE_INTERMEDIATE response (optional)
HDR, SK{KEr(n)} - IKE_AUTH IKE_AUTH request
HDR, SK{IDi, [CERT,] AUTH, SAi2, TSi, TSr} - IKE_AUTH response
HDR, SK{IDr, [CERT,] AUTH, SAr2, TSi, TSr} - CREATE_CHILD_SA CREATE_CHILD_SA request
HDR, SK{SA, Ni, [KEi,] [TSi, TSr]} - CREATE_CHILD_SA response
HDR, SK{SA, Nr, [KEr,] [TSi, TSr]} - INFORMATIONAL INFORMATIONAL request
HDR, SK{[N,] [D,] [CP,] …} - INFORMATIONAL response
HDR, SK{[N,] [D,] [CP,] …}
- IKE_SA_INIT negotiates the cryptographic suite (encryption, PRF, integrity, key exchange method; see transforms) and performs the key exchange in the KE payloads. From the shared secret and the nonces, both sides derive
SKEYSEED. From that come the keysSK_d(for deriving Child SA keys),SK_ai/ar(integrity),SK_ei/er(encryption) andSK_pi/pr(used in the AUTH computation). This exchange is not encrypted. - IKE_INTERMEDIATE (optional, RFC 9242) sits between IKE_SA_INIT and IKE_AUTH and is already encrypted. It is where additional, large PQ key exchanges go.
- IKE_AUTH is encrypted with those keys. Each peer proves its identity in the AUTH payload, with a signature or a pre-shared key, and the first ESP Child SA is set up.
- CREATE_CHILD_SA creates more Child SAs and rekeys existing ones. INFORMATIONAL carries notifications, deletes and liveness checks.
1.2 Where the quantum computer hits
| Phase / exchange | Component | Quantum impact | Urgency |
|---|---|---|---|
| IKE_SA_INIT, CREATE_CHILD_SA (rekey with PFS) | KE (DH/ECDH) | Broken by Shor; enables decryption of recorded traffic (HNDL) | High (HNDL) |
| IKE_AUTH | AUTH (RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA signatures) and certificates | Broken by Shor; enables active impersonation once a CRQC exists | Medium, rising |
| All exchanges and ESP | PRF, integrity, encryption (HMAC, AES) | Only Grover; fine with adequate key sizes | Low |
1.3 Extensions that make PQC possible in IKEv2
Each of these RFCs fixes a specific limitation of the original protocol. Section 3 explains them in detail:
- RFC 7383: IKEv2 message fragmentation. It only works on encrypted messages, so not on IKE_SA_INIT. See 3.2.
- RFC 9242: the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange, encrypted and therefore fragmentable; the place for large PQ public keys. See 3.2.
- RFC 9370: multiple key exchanges, up to seven additional ones (ADDKE1–7), each mixed into the keying material. See 3.1.
- RFC 7427: generic Digital Signature authentication (method 14). See 3.4 and 2.3.
- RFC 9593: announcing supported authentication methods (SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS) before IKE_AUTH. See 3.4.
1.4 Why RFC 9395 (IKEv1 deprecation) matters for PQC
RFC 9395 (April 2023) deprecated IKEv1 and moved RFCs 2407, 2408 and 2409 to Historic, together with a set of obsolete algorithms. That matters for PQC in three ways:
- Every PQC mechanism is IKEv2-only. IKE_INTERMEDIATE, multiple key exchanges, ML-KEM code points, PQ signature authentication and PPK mixing are all defined for IKEv2. IKEv1 has no standardised way to carry an additional key exchange.
- No new work for IKEv1. Historic status means the IETF will not add new algorithms or extensions to IKEv1. An IKEv1 tunnel therefore cannot become quantum-resistant through standards.
- It is a good inventory trigger. The same document deprecates old algorithms (DES variants, MD5- and SHA-1-based integrity, among others). Systems that still use them usually also lack the firmware headroom for PQC.
If you still run IKEv1, migrating to IKEv2 is step zero of your PQC migration.
2. IANA: the IKEv2 registries
The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) keeps the protocol registries (for the other standards bodies, see part 1). An IETF document defines what an algorithm does in a protocol; IANA assigns the number that goes on the wire. For IKEv2 everything lives in the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) Parameters registry. Most of its sub-registries use Expert Review (current experts: Tero Kivinen and Valery Smyslov). The registry was last updated on 13 November 2026.
2.1 Transforms, transform types and transform IDs
In IKE_SA_INIT the initiator offers one or more proposals in the SA payload. Each proposal is a list of transforms. Every transform has two numbers:
- a Transform Type, saying what role the algorithm plays: 1 = encryption (ENCR), 2 = pseudo-random function (PRF), 3 = integrity (INTEG), 4 = key exchange method (KE), 5 = sequence numbers, and since RFC 9370, 6–12 = additional key exchanges 1–7 (ADDKE1–ADDKE7);
- a Transform ID, saying which algorithm within that role. The numbering is separate per type.
“Transform Type 4, ID 36” therefore means “key exchange method: ML-KEM-768”. The same number 36 under another transform type means something else entirely. Transform Type 4 IDs used to be called Diffie-Hellman group numbers, and that is why many configuration guides still talk about “DH group 19” or “DH group 31”. A PQ/T hybrid proposal could look like this:
Proposal 1:
Type 1 (ENCR) ID 20 ENCR_AES_GCM_16, 256-bit key
Type 2 (PRF) ID 6 PRF_HMAC_SHA2_384
Type 4 (KE) ID 20 384-bit random ECP group (P-384)
Type 6 (ADDKE1) ID 37 ml-kem-1024
The responder picks one transform per type. Here that results in ECDH P-384 in IKE_SA_INIT, followed by ML-KEM-1024 in an IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange.
2.2 PQC-relevant registry entries
| Registry | Entry | Defined by |
|---|---|---|
| Transform Types | Type 4 renamed from “Diffie-Hellman Group” to Key Exchange Method (KE) | RFC 9370 |
| Transform Types | Types 6–12: Additional Key Exchange 1–7 (ADDKE1…ADDKE7) | RFC 9370 |
| Transform Type 4 IDs (also valid for types 6–12) | 35 ml-kem-512, 36 ml-kem-768, 37 ml-kem-1024 | draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem |
| Authentication Method | 14 Digital Signature (generic, see below) | RFC 7427 |
| Hash Algorithms (SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS) | 5 Identity (needed for ML-DSA/SLH-DSA, which hash internally) | RFC 8420 |
| Notify types | USE_PPK (16435), PPK_IDENTITY (16436), NO_PPK_AUTH (16437) | RFC 8784 |
| Notify types | USE_PPK_INT (16445), PPK_IDENTITY_KEY (16446) | RFC 9867 |
| Transform registries | “Status” column marking deprecated algorithms | RFC 9395 |
2.3 Authentication method 14: how it was done before
In the AUTH payload, the Auth Method field tells the receiver how to verify the authentication data. Originally, each method number fixed the complete algorithm, including the hash:
| Value | Method | Defined in | What was fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | RSA Digital Signature | RFC 7296 | RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5; the hash was not negotiated |
| 2 | Shared Key Message Integrity Code | RFC 7296 | PSK-based MAC with the negotiated PRF |
| 3 | DSS Digital Signature | RFC 7296 | DSA with SHA-1 |
| 9 / 10 / 11 | ECDSA with SHA-256 on P-256 / SHA-384 on P-384 / SHA-512 on P-521 | RFC 4754 | curve and hash per number |
| 14 | Digital Signature | RFC 7427 | nothing: the algorithm is named inside the AUTH data |
This model did not scale. Every new combination of signature scheme, parameters and hash, such as RSA-PSS or Ed25519, needed a new method number and a new RFC. RFC 7427 (2015) solved this with the generic method 14. The AUTH data starts with an ASN.1 AlgorithmIdentifier, the same object identifiers (OIDs) used in X.509 certificates, followed by the signature. The hash function is negotiated separately with the SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS notification.
For PQC this is very convenient. ML-DSA, SLH-DSA and composite ML-DSA need no new IKEv2 code points: they reuse the OIDs from RFC 9881, RFC 9909 and RFC 10073. draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth makes no IANA requests at all. The only addition is the “Identity” hash (5), because ML-DSA and SLH-DSA sign the whole message themselves instead of a pre-computed hash (section 3.4).
2.4 The PPK notifications
Post-quantum preshared keys (PPKs) are negotiated with five Notify payloads:
| Notify (value) | RFC | Sent in | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| USE_PPK (16435) | RFC 8784 | IKE_SA_INIT, both directions | “I support PPKs and want to use one.” No data. |
| PPK_IDENTITY (16436) | RFC 8784 | IKE_AUTH (request); reused by RFC 9867 in the IKE_INTERMEDIATE response | Identifies which PPK is used (the PPK_ID). In RFC 9867 the responder uses it to confirm the PPK it selected. |
| NO_PPK_AUTH (16437) | RFC 8784 | IKE_AUTH request | Contains an alternative AUTH value computed without the PPK, so that a responder without that PPK can still authenticate the initiator when PPK use is optional |
| USE_PPK_INT (16445) | RFC 9867 | IKE_SA_INIT, both directions, together with INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTED | Negotiates the RFC 9867 variant, where the PPK is mixed in during IKE_INTERMEDIATE so that the initial IKE SA is protected too |
| PPK_IDENTITY_KEY (16446) | RFC 9867 | Last IKE_INTERMEDIATE request | One or more candidate PPKs, each as a PPK_ID plus an 8-byte PPK Confirmation (first 8 bytes of prf(PPK, Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr)). The responder can check that it has the same PPK without the key being revealed. |
A responder chooses one mechanism: RFC 8784 (USE_PPK) or RFC 9867 (USE_PPK_INT), never both.
3. Why IKEv2 needs extensions for pure PQ, PQ/T and PQ/PQ
IKEv2 as specified in RFC 7296 was designed around Diffie-Hellman and classical signatures. Several of its assumptions break as soon as post-quantum algorithms enter the picture. This section explains which assumptions break and which extension fixes each one.
3.1 Assumption 1: exactly one key exchange per SA
In RFC 7296, the SA proposal carries a single Transform Type 4 (D-H group), and IKE_SA_INIT carries a single KE payload. There is no way to negotiate or perform two key exchanges. Every hybrid needs at least two, so this is the first blocker.
Fix: RFC 9370 (Multiple Key Exchanges). It renames Transform Type 4 to Key Exchange Method and adds Transform Types 6–12, Additional Key Exchange 1–7 (example proposal). These carry up to seven extra key exchanges, run one by one in IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges (during initial setup) or in IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchanges (when creating or rekeying SAs). After each additional exchange, the new shared secret is chained into the keying material: SKEYSEED(n) = prf(SK_d(n-1), SK(n) | Ni | Nr). The final keys therefore depend on all shared secrets, which is exactly the “secure if one component holds” property a hybrid needs.
An ADDKE transform may include the value NONE, which makes that extra exchange optional. That is useful for interoperability, but it opens a downgrade path. A policy that requires PQ must therefore not offer NONE.
3.2 Assumption 2: IKE_SA_INIT messages are small
IKE_SA_INIT is sent before any keys exist, so it is neither encrypted nor integrity-protected. IKEv2 fragmentation (RFC 7383) only works inside the encrypted SK payload, which means IKE_SA_INIT cannot be fragmented by IKE. Traditional KE payloads are small: 32 bytes for X25519, 96 for P-384, 384 for MODP-3072. With nonces, the SA proposal, NAT detection and possibly a cookie, IKE_SA_INIT fits comfortably in one packet.
ML-KEM-768 adds about 1.2 KB on the initiator side, ML-KEM-1024 about 1.6 KB, and FrodoKEM roughly ten times as much (sizes in section 6). The result exceeds the 1,280-byte IPv6 minimum MTU and often the typical 1,500-byte Ethernet path. IP fragmentation of UDP is then the only option, and fragments are frequently dropped by firewalls, NAT devices and carrier networks. Fragments are also a known denial-of-service vector.
Fix: RFC 9242 (IKE_INTERMEDIATE). This new exchange sits between IKE_SA_INIT and IKE_AUTH. It is already protected with keys derived from IKE_SA_INIT, so it can be fragmented with RFC 7383. Large PQ public keys and ciphertexts go there instead of into IKE_SA_INIT. RFC 9242 also adds the IKE_INTERMEDIATE content to the data signed in IKE_AUTH, so the intermediate exchanges are authenticated afterwards.
The alternative is a transport without this limit: TCP encapsulation (RFC 9329), or the separate IKE and ESP transports in draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-reliable-transport.
3.3 Assumption 3: the key exchange is Diffie-Hellman
With Diffie-Hellman, both peers send a public value of the same kind, and either side could send first. A KEM is asymmetric:
- The initiator generates a key pair and sends the encapsulation key.
- The responder runs Encaps and sends back a ciphertext.
- The initiator runs Decaps. Both now share the same 32-byte secret.
Luckily, this maps onto the IKEv2 request/response flow, because the initiator always speaks first. It still needs its own specification: what goes into the KE payload on each side, which validity checks must be done (FIPS 203 encapsulation key check and ciphertext type check), and the rule that key pairs must never be reused. Some DH implementations reuse ephemeral keys for performance; for ML-KEM that is forbidden. This is what draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem defines, together with the IANA code points 35–37. Every additional KEM, such as FrodoKEM or HQC, needs a similar document and code points of its own.
3.4 Assumption 4: one signature algorithm per authentication method
RFC 7296 ties authentication methods to specific algorithms (RSA = 1, DSS = 3), and RFC 4754 added ECDSA variants (9–11) with a fixed hash per curve (history). Adding a new method number for every PQ parameter set does not scale.
Fix: RFC 7427 (Digital Signature, method 14) identifies the algorithm with an X.509 AlgorithmIdentifier, so the OIDs from RFC 9881 (ML-DSA), RFC 9909 (SLH-DSA) and RFC 10073 (composite) can be reused. RFC 7427 assumes hash-then-sign, with the hash negotiated in SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS. ML-DSA and SLH-DSA instead process the whole message internally, so peers must announce the “Identity” hash (RFC 8420). RFC 9593 (SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS) lets peers tell each other which signature algorithms they accept before IKE_AUTH. All of this is specified in draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth.
PQ signatures plus certificate chains add several kilobytes to IKE_AUTH. IKE_AUTH is encrypted, so RFC 7383 fragmentation can carry them, and the draft makes fragmentation support mandatory.
3.5 Assumption 5: one AUTH payload per peer
A peer authenticates with one AUTH payload. A composite signature (RFC 10073) is one algorithm, one key and one signature, so it fits without protocol changes; draft-ietf-ipsecme-pq-hybrid-auth profiles it. Parallel hybrid authentication with two independent certificates and signatures does not fit and needs protocol changes. That is the subject of individual drafts such as draft-hu-ipsecme-pqt-hybrid-auth-with-sep-cert and draft-wang-ipsecme-multi-auth-ikev2-pq.
3.6 What each mode needs
| Mode | Typical IKEv2 setup | Extensions required | Remaining constraints |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pure PQ | ML-KEM as the only KE in IKE_SA_INIT; ML-DSA or SLH-DSA authentication | ML-KEM KE draft (KEM semantics, code points); PQC-auth draft + RFC 7427 + RFC 8420 + RFC 7383 | Only ML-KEM-512 fits IKE_SA_INIT safely over UDP. ML-KEM-768/1024 need a known large PMTU or a reliable transport (RFC 9329). No fallback if ML-KEM is ever broken. This is why CNSA 2.0 does not simply put ML-KEM-1024 in IKE_SA_INIT. |
| PQ/T hybrid | (EC)DH in IKE_SA_INIT + ML-KEM as ADDKE1 in IKE_INTERMEDIATE; composite or PQ authentication | RFC 9370 + RFC 9242 + RFC 7383 + ML-KEM KE draft; for authentication, RFC 10073 + the hybrid-auth draft | One extra round trip. Policy must omit NONE in ADDKE1 to prevent downgrade. |
| PQ/PQ hybrid | Two PQ KEMs from different families, e.g. ML-KEM + FrodoKEM (or HQC) | Everything above + a KE specification and IANA code points for the second KEM (FrodoKEM: WG draft; HQC: individual draft; no code points yet) | IKE_SA_INIT still needs a KE: a traditional group (giving a triple hybrid), ML-KEM-512, or a reliable transport. FrodoKEM’s size makes fragmentation unavoidable. Each extra KEM adds a round trip. |
For most deployments PQ/T hybrid is the sensible default: it protects against a quantum computer and against a flaw in the young PQ algorithm, as long as not both happen at once (scenario table in part 1). PQ-only removes that safety net.
Two newer ideas aim to reduce the cost of all this. A composite key exchange carries a PQ and a traditional KEM in one exchange over a reliable transport (draft-reddy-ipsecme-ikev2-hybrid-reliable, individual). Downgrade prevention is being made generic in draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-downgrade-prevention, which is in the RFC Editor queue.
4. The ipsecme work
The IP Security Maintenance and Extensions (ipsecme) working group maintains IKEv2 and ESP and specifies how PQC is used in them. Certificates (lamps) and general PQC guidance (pquip) are covered in part 1.
| Document | Subject | Status (Nov 2026) |
|---|---|---|
| RFC 8784 | Mixing PPKs into IKEv2 | Proposed Standard (Jun 2020) |
| RFC 9242 | IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange | Proposed Standard (May 2022) |
| RFC 9370 | Multiple key exchanges in IKEv2 | Proposed Standard (May 2023) |
| RFC 9395 | Deprecation of IKEv1 and obsolete algorithms | Proposed Standard (Apr 2023) |
| RFC 9867 | PPKs in IKE_INTERMEDIATE and CREATE_CHILD_SA | Proposed Standard (Nov 2025) |
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem-09 | ML-KEM key exchange in IKEv2 (alone or as additional exchange) | RFC Editor queue, intended Proposed Standard; code points 35–37 assigned |
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth-12 | ML-DSA and SLH-DSA authentication in IKEv2 | RFC Editor queue, intended Proposed Standard |
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-downgrade-prevention-08 | Protection against downgrade attacks | RFC Editor queue |
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-reliable-transport-08 | Separate transports for IKE and ESP | Submitted to IESG |
draft-ietf-ipsecme-pq-hybrid-auth-01 | Composite signatures (RFC 10073) in IKEv2 | WG document |
draft-ietf-ipsecme-hybrid-kem-ikev2-frodo-03 | FrodoKEM key exchange in IKEv2 | WG document |
draft-guthrie-cnsa2-ipsec-profile-05 | CNSA 2.0 profile for IPsec (would obsolete RFC 9206) | Individual, intended Informational |
Key details of the two most important drafts:
- ML-KEM (
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem-09): the KE payload carries the ML-KEM encapsulation key (initiator) or ciphertext (responder). A fresh key pair is required for every exchange, and keys must not be reused. Recipients must perform the input checks from FIPS 203 (encapsulation key check, ciphertext type check). The 32-byte shared secret is used just like the (EC)DH shared secret. - PQC authentication (
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth-12): uses the RFC 7427 Digital Signature method, with ML-DSA-44/65/87 and all twelve SLH-DSA parameter sets. Only pure mode is used (no HashML-DSA). Peers must advertise the “Identity” hash in SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS, and IKEv2 fragmentation is mandatory because of the signature sizes. Hedged signing is preferred over deterministic. Whether PQ authentication is required is local policy; if it is optional, a downgrade is possible.
5. Algorithm overview
The table classifies the algorithms you will meet in IKEv2/IPsec by role. Security categories and sizes per algorithm are in part 1. Labels:
- T: traditional, a quantum-vulnerable asymmetric algorithm (RFC 9794);
- PQ: post-quantum, an asymmetric algorithm designed to resist quantum attacks;
- QR: quantum-resistant, a symmetric or hash-based primitive that remains secure against known quantum attacks at the listed parameters;
- ”–” means the algorithm does not play that role.
| Algorithm (IANA ID) | Key exchange | PRF / key derivation | Integrity | Authentication | Encryption |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MODP DH groups 14–18 | T | – | – | – | – |
| ECDH P-256 / P-384 / P-521 (19/20/21) | T | – | – | – | – |
| brainpoolP256r1 / P384r1 / P512r1 (28/29/30) | T | – | – | – | – |
| Curve25519 / Curve448 (31/32) | T | – | – | – | – |
| ML-KEM-512 / -768 / -1024 (35/36/37) | PQ1 | – | – | – | – |
| FrodoKEM | PQ2 | – | – | – | – |
| HQC | PQ3 | – | – | – | – |
| PPK (RFC 8784, RFC 9867) | – | QR4 | – | – | – |
| HMAC-SHA2-256 / -384 / -512 PRF (5/6/7) | – | QR5 | – | – | – |
| HMAC-SHA2-256-128 / -384-192 / -512-256 (12/13/14) | – | – | QR5 | – | – |
| AES-CBC-128 / -256 (12) | – | – | – | – | QR6 |
| AES-GCM-128 / -256 (20) | – | – | QR6 | – | QR6 |
| ChaCha20-Poly1305 (28) | – | – | QR | – | QR |
| RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5, PSS) | – | – | – | T | – |
| ECDSA P-256 / P-384 / P-521 | – | – | – | T | – |
| Ed25519 / Ed448 | – | – | – | T | – |
| ML-DSA-44 / -65 / -87 | – | – | – | PQ7 | – |
| SLH-DSA (12 parameter sets) | – | – | – | PQ7 | – |
| Composite ML-DSA (RFC 10073) | – | – | – | T + PQ8 | – |
| FN-DSA | – | – | – | PQ9 | – |
| PSK authentication (RFC 7296) | – | – | – | QR10 | – |
6. Key exchange and signature sizes in IKEv2
PQ keys and signatures are one to three orders of magnitude larger than their traditional counterparts (full size table in part 1). That size difference is the main engineering challenge in IKEv2, because IKE runs over UDP and IKE_SA_INIT cannot be fragmented (section 3.2).
Bytes, logarithmic scale. The rest of IKE_SA_INIT (headers, SA proposal, nonce, NAT detection) comes on top of this. Hover a bar for details.
Show data as table
| Key exchange | Type | Initiator KE data (bytes) |
|---|---|---|
| X25519 | T | 32 |
| ECP P-256 | T | 64 |
| ECP P-384 | T | 96 |
| ECP P-521 | T | 132 |
| MODP-3072 | T | 384 |
| MODP-4096 | T | 512 |
| ML-KEM-512 | PQ | 800 |
| ML-KEM-768 | PQ | 1,184 |
| ML-KEM-1024 | PQ | 1,568 |
| FrodoKEM-640 | PQ | 9,616 |
| FrodoKEM-976 | PQ | 15,632 |
| FrodoKEM-1344 | PQ | 21,520 |
| Item | Size (bytes) | Carried in | Fits an unfragmented IKE_SA_INIT over UDP? | What makes it work |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| X25519 / ECP P-384 / ECP P-521 | 32 / 96 / 132 | IKE_SA_INIT | Yes | – |
| MODP-3072 / MODP-4096 | 384 / 512 | IKE_SA_INIT | Yes | – |
| ML-KEM-512 (initiator / responder) | 800 / 768 | IKE_SA_INIT or IKE_INTERMEDIATE | Yes (the ML-KEM draft allows it) | – |
| ML-KEM-768 | 1,184 / 1,088 | IKE_INTERMEDIATE | No, unless the path MTU is known to be large | RFC 9242 + RFC 9370 + RFC 7383, or TCP (RFC 9329) |
| ML-KEM-1024 | 1,568 / 1,568 | IKE_INTERMEDIATE | No | RFC 9242 + RFC 9370 + RFC 7383, or TCP |
| FrodoKEM-640 … -1344 | 9,616 … 21,520 / 9,720 … 21,632 | IKE_INTERMEDIATE | No (several fragments) | RFC 9242 + RFC 9370 + RFC 7383 |
| ECDSA P-256 / Ed25519 signature | ≈ 64–72 / 64 | IKE_AUTH | n/a (IKE_AUTH is encrypted) | – |
| ECDSA P-384 / P-521 signature | ≈ 96–104 / ≈ 132–139 | IKE_AUTH | n/a | – |
| RSA-3072 / RSA-4096 signature | 384 / 512 | IKE_AUTH | n/a | – |
| ML-DSA-44 / -65 / -87 signature (public key) | 2,420 / 3,309 / 4,627 (1,312 / 1,952 / 2,592) | IKE_AUTH (+ certificates) | n/a | RFC 7383 fragmentation (mandatory in the PQC-auth draft) |
| SLH-DSA-128s … -256f signature | 7,856 … 49,856 | IKE_AUTH | n/a | RFC 7383 fragmentation |
Sizes are the raw key exchange data and signatures. The KE payload adds an 8-byte header, and IKE_SA_INIT also carries headers, the SA proposal, nonces and notifications. Each certificate in IKE_AUTH carries a public key and a CA signature, so a PQ certificate chain easily reaches 10 KB or more.
7. CNSA 2.0 and IPsec
The NSA algorithm suites, their timeline and the comparison with NIST SP 800-227 are in part 1. For IPsec specifically:
| Suite | IPsec profile | Key exchange in IKEv2 |
|---|---|---|
| Suite B (2005) | RFC 6379 / RFC 6380 (2011), Historic since RFC 8423 (2018) | ECDH P-256 or P-384 |
| CNSA 1.0 (2015/16) | RFC 9206 (2022, Independent Submission) | ECDH P-384, DH-3072 or DH-4096 |
| CNSA 2.0 (2022) | draft-guthrie-cnsa2-ipsec-profile-05 (Oct 2026, individual, would obsolete RFC 9206) | CNSA 1.0 key exchange plus ML-KEM-1024 as additional key exchange |
RFC 9206 defines three CNSA 1.0 IPsec suites: CNSA-GCM-256-ECDH-384, CNSA-GCM-256-DH-3072 and CNSA-GCM-256-DH-4096. They all use IKEv2, AES-256-GCM, and PRF_HMAC_SHA_512 (SHA-512 because of availability, although SHA-384 is the CNSA hash).
In its CNSA 2.0 FAQ, NSA notes that ML-KEM-1024 cannot simply replace the CNSA 1.0 key exchange in IKEv2 because of message size (section 6). It expects to use the IETF approach: a smaller initial key exchange followed by a larger, encrypted one. Concretely, CNSA 1.0 key establishment in IKE_SA_INIT is fortified by ML-KEM-1024 in an additional exchange (RFC 9370). NSA does not require hybrids. It rejects non-standard hybrids on NSS, but it does mention PPKs (RFC 8784) as possibly appropriate for specialised cases.
For VPN products, the CNSA 2.0 category table sets support and prefer by 2026, exclusive use by 2030, and from 1 January 2027 all new acquisitions for US national security systems must be CNSA 2.0-compliant (timeline in part 1).
8. Designing for several regimes
European, Australian and US authorities differ on hybrids, parameter sizes and deadlines (part 1, section 2.3). A VPN that must satisfy several regimes at once ends up with the union of their requirements:
- PQ/T hybrid key exchange (for BSI and ANSSI);
- category 5 parameters, ML-KEM-1024 (for ASD and CNSA 2.0);
- a completion date of 2030 for the most demanding customers.
IKEv2 with RFC 9370 can satisfy all of them in one configuration, for example ECDH P-384 plus ML-KEM-1024. The flexibility to do that is the practical meaning of crypto agility.
9. A practical migration path
- Retire IKEv1 (RFC 9395). There is no PQC path for it (section 1.4).
- Determine which regimes apply (EU/NIS2 sector, BSI, ANSSI, NCSC, ASD, CNSA 2.0; see section 8 and part 1). They decide hybrid versus pure PQ, the parameter category, and your deadline.
- Inventory your gateways, clients, PKI and HSMs. Check firmware upgradability and vendor roadmaps for ML-KEM and ML-DSA.
- Enable the plumbing: IKEv2 fragmentation (RFC 7383), IKE_INTERMEDIATE (RFC 9242) and multiple key exchanges (RFC 9370). Consider TCP encapsulation (RFC 9329) where UDP fragmentation is a problem.
- Deploy PQ/T hybrid key exchange now: (EC)DH in IKE_SA_INIT plus ML-KEM-768, or ML-KEM-1024 for CNSA 2.0 and ASD, as ADDKE1. This addresses harvest-now-decrypt-later.
- Where you control both ends and can distribute keys, add a PPK (RFC 8784, or RFC 9867 to also protect the initial IKE SA).
- Strengthen the classical part: AES-256-GCM, PRF and integrity with SHA-384 or SHA-512, ECDH groups 20/21/29/30/32.
- Prepare PQ authentication: an ML-DSA (RFC 9881) or composite ML-DSA (RFC 10073) PKI, with attention to certificate chain sizes. Track
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-authuntil it becomes an RFC. - Close the downgrade door: once all peers support ML-KEM, refuse proposals without it.
- Build in agility: algorithms in configuration, not code. Expect FN-DSA, HQC and new IETF RFCs in the coming years.
10. Sources
IETF: RFCs
- RFC 7296: IKEv2 (STD 79)
- RFC 9395: Deprecation of IKEv1
- RFC 7383: IKEv2 Message Fragmentation
- RFC 9242: Intermediate Exchange in IKEv2
- RFC 9370: Multiple Key Exchanges in IKEv2
- RFC 8784: Mixing Preshared Keys in IKEv2
- RFC 9867: PPKs in IKE_INTERMEDIATE and CREATE_CHILD_SA
- RFC 4754: IKE and IKEv2 Authentication Using ECDSA
- RFC 7427: Signature Authentication in IKEv2
- RFC 8420: Using EdDSA in IKEv2 (Identity hash)
- RFC 9593: Announcing Supported Authentication Methods in IKEv2
- RFC 9329: TCP Encapsulation of IKE and IPsec Packets
- RFC 8247: Algorithm requirements for IKEv2
- RFC 7696: Guidelines for Cryptographic Algorithm Agility (BCP 201)
- RFC 2026, RFC 6410, RFC 7127: IETF standards process
- RFC 9794: Terminology for PQ/T Hybrid Schemes
- RFC 9958: Post-Quantum Cryptography for Engineers
- RFC 9955: Hybrid Signature Spectrums
- RFC 9881: ML-DSA in X.509
- RFC 9909: SLH-DSA in X.509
- RFC 10073: Composite ML-DSA
- RFC 9206: CNSA Suite for IPsec
- RFC 6379 and RFC 6380: Suite B for IPsec (Historic)
- RFC 8423: Reclassification of Suite B documents to Historic
IETF: Internet-Drafts and working groups
- ipsecme, in the RFC Editor queue or with the IESG:
- ipsecme, WG documents:
- pquip, active with the IESG:
- Individual drafts:
- Working group pages: ipsecme · pquip · lamps
IANA
NIST
- NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography project and publications
- NIST SP 800-227: Recommendations for Key-Encapsulation Mechanisms
- NIST IR 8547 (final)
NSA
Background (part 1)
- Post-Quantum Cryptography: Threat, Standards and Timelines: policy documents, NIST, EU/ASD/NSA guidance and research sources
Footnotes
-
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem-09(RFC Editor queue). Code points assigned. ML-KEM-768 and -1024 should run in IKE_INTERMEDIATE or IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE (RFC 9370) unless the path MTU is known or a reliable transport is used. ↩ -
Conservative unstructured-lattice KEM, not a NIST standard. Specified for IKEv2 in
draft-ietf-ipsecme-hybrid-kem-ikev2-frodo-03(WG document). No IANA code point yet. ↩ -
Code-based KEM selected by NIST in March 2025 as a backup to ML-KEM. The FIPS (expected FIPS 207) is not yet final. IKEv2 usage is only an individual draft (
draft-reddy-ipsecme-ikev2-hqc-00). ↩ -
Not a key exchange but a symmetric secret mixed into key derivation. It is only as quantum-resistant as the PPK’s entropy and out-of-band distribution. RFC 8784 protects Child SAs only; RFC 9867 also protects the initial IKE SA. ↩
-
HMAC with SHA-2 is not meaningfully weakened by known quantum algorithms. CNSA 2.0 requires SHA-384 or SHA-512. ↩ ↩2
-
Grover’s algorithm offers at most a quadratic speed-up and parallelises poorly. NIST uses AES-128 key search as the benchmark for its lowest PQ security category. Policy profiles such as CNSA 2.0 nevertheless require AES-256. ↩ ↩2 ↩3
-
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth-12(RFC Editor queue). Uses RFC 7427 with OIDs from RFC 9881 / RFC 9909, pure mode only, requires the “Identity” hash and IKEv2 fragmentation. ↩ ↩2 -
PQ/T hybrid: one composite key and one composite signature. Defined in RFC 10073 (Proposed Standard, Nov 2026). IKEv2 usage in
draft-ietf-ipsecme-pq-hybrid-auth-01(WG document). ↩ -
Falcon-based. FIPS 206 is not yet final. IKEv2 usage only in an individual draft (
draft-fu-ipsecme-ikev2-fn-dsa-pkr-00). ↩ -
Symmetric, so not affected by Shor, but only secure with a high-entropy key. Low-entropy (password-like) PSKs are vulnerable to offline dictionary attacks even without a quantum computer. ↩
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